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Abstract
 
This paper attempts to outline a methodology for reconstructing the history of big 
enterprise. The problem is to construct an institutional narrative that captures the essential 
dynamics of corporate institution creation, institutional change, development into a large 
corporation and its maturity. It is argued that accounting data can be one of the most 
important inputs in this regard. However, accounting data is necessary but not sufficient 
for a complete account of the history of a large corporate enterprise. Similarly, other 
sources of information are necessary but not sufficient for the above purpose without 
accounting data. This paper focuses on the use of accounting data for reconstructing 
corporate history and also addresses partially how such data can be combined with other 
sources of information to provide a complete story. We delve briefly into the nature of 
accounting data and the structure of accounting record keeping. Reconstructing corporate 
history involves asking appropriate questions on financial structure, capital budgeting and 
investments, operations and strategy that accounting data reveal.
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Business enterprises are the engines of economic growth and development. Therefore, to 
understand the process of growth, one has to understand how businesses come into being, 
grow, operate under different economies of scale and scope, survive firm specific risks, 
industry specific risks, macroeconomic risks of structural transformation and ultimately how 
businesses perish from, adapt to, or change the economic landscape. While both big 
business and small business play an important role in growth of production and 
employment, our focus here will be on the  big business for its significant role in boosting  
employment, output and  income levels.  This is not to deny the importance of small 
business enterprise, but rather, to acknowledge the relatively more   important role of the big 
business in long term economic growth, and to not engage in the impossible task of writing 
about big business and small business history together. 
 
Big business, or the modern corporation, has been important since the last three centuries, 
thanks to the innovation of the concept of limited liability and the growth of   the capital 
markets in important   financial centres of the developed world. However, the growth of the   
large corporations and the world economy (particularly the US economy) started taking 
place in   the second half of   the 19th century with the triad of   organization, technology 
and finance beginning to   work   in an   unprecedented way.  History of these corporations 
tell   us about the real nature of   the real relationship of organization, technology and   
finance and why they happened   when they did   in the developed  world  and  why 
corporate  growth  has  been limited and sporadic  in the  developing and less developed 
countries. There are many  important  sources   for  learning and reconstructing corporate  
history  such  as  diaries,  biographies, minutes of  board meetings, memos, newspaper and 
magazine reports. In this paper I shall argue how corporate  history can  be  reconstructed 
using  accounting data and  how such a source of  information  is a  necessary factor   in  the  
successful reconstruction  of  a  corporate business  history.    
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Neoclassical economic theory treated the firm as a technology of  transforming   some 
inputs  into  some outputs. The firm was essentially treated as a blackbox with what  
transactions happened   inside seen as being unimportant. Over time, there has been 
significant developments in the theory of the firm. Knight (1921) focused on the 
entrepreneurial   nature of the firm where decision making  processes and discoveries  of 
markets were determined under  uncertainty.  Coase (1937) took the concept of the firm 
seriously and   developed his transactions costs theory which said that whatever could be 
made cheaper within the firm rather than the  market  would  be  characterizing and giving 
rise to  the  organizational  nature  of the  firm. Penrose (1959) emphasized learning by 
doing, and point out that production which requires deliberate rational mental processes 
becomes routine freeing entrepreneurial and managerial capacity to search for different and 
new markets and activities. Alchian and Demsetz (1972) emphasized team production and 
the need for a monitor to prevent shirking. Jensen and Meckling (1976) highlighted the 
conception of the firm as “nexus” of contracts and argued that the real task lay in mitigating 
different agency costs accompanying principal-agent contracts.  Williamson (1985) 
extended the notion of transaction costs to characterize modern capitalistic institutions as 
economizing on them with vertical integration of firms being the most important example. 
Recently, economists have investigated real versus formal authority in firms, 
communication methods and control, delegation of decision making, coordination, 
specialization and ownership of assets and the provision of incentives in a multilayered 
hierarchy. Management scientists have traditionally studied the firm along behavioural lines 
focusing on motivation, cognitive aspects and culture and complemented them with studies 
on business processes and strategy. However, it has been increasingly becoming clear, that 
the understanding of large business in all its complexity, would require an interdisciplinary 
approach with special emphasis on dynamics explored through the tools of historical and 
theoretical research.  
 
As Chandler (1977) and Milgrom and  Roberts (1992) have described it, the modern 
business enterprise emerged when the transportation and communication revolution made 
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possible the economies of scale in mass production and distribution. In response, each of the 
organizations growing into large scale made investments in production and distribution 
capacity and build up a management run hierarchy. There were investments made in 
management and finance which gave rise to large scale firms in other industries and a 
momentum of growth was generated for the large scale enterprises. The large corporation 
further strengthened itself through devising a suitable organizational structure and 
management hierarchy after World War I. As the authors point out, the modern large 
business enterprise is distinguished  by two  characteristics: one,  in  that it contains many 
distinct  operating units and  two, in that it is managed by  a  hierarchy  of salaried 
executives  or managers. Each operating unit within the modern multiunit business 
enterprise has its own administrative office and is administered by a full time salaried 
manager. Each unit has its books and accounts which can be audited separately and  it could  
in  principle run as  an  independent business  organization.  By virtue of bringing many 
such divisions or  units under its  control, the  modern business enterprise  could  locate   in  
different geographical  areas,  have  multiple  product lines   and  be functionally 
differentiated.  To monitor and coordinate the activities of these different divisions, the firm 
needed to be designed  as  a complex hierarchy  of management at  each level. At the top 
level of management there was the problem of planning, performance evaluation of units 
below, and allocation of resources for different divisions, at the middle level the 
management had to basically coordinate and monitor, while at the lowest level there was the 
task of supervision. This management structure reaped the best of both worlds: creating a 
decentralized structure enabled companies like Ford, Standard Oil, Du Pont and Sears to use 
local information to the advantage of the firm, while the organizational structure and 
management reporting enabled sufficient centralization. 
 
According to Chandler (1977), the  modern  multiunit business enterprise replaced the small  
traditional enterprise  when  improvements in communication and transportation enabled the 
internalisation of the activities of  the different  units within   the same firm  led  to   some  
advantages  of   administrative coordination –“By  routinizing the   transactions  between  
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units,  the  costs  of these  transactions  were  lowered.  By linking the administration of 
producing units with buying and distributing units, costs for information on  markets and 
sources of supply were reduced. Of much greater significance, the internalisation of many 
units permitted the flow of goods from one unit to another to be administratively 
coordinated.  More effective rescheduling of flows achieved a more intensive use of 
facilities and personnel employed in the processes of production and distribution and so 
increased productivity and reduced  costs. In addition, administrative coordination provided 
a more certain cash flow and more rapid payment for services rendered.”1   
 
Chandler focused on management as the most important constituency in the modern 
capitalistic organization. The separation of ownership and control had resulted in 
permanence and power of the management hierarchy in an organization. In addition, the rise 
of managerial capitalism was made possible by replacing families and financial institutions 
or their representatives (practicing what was then a form of financial capitalism) by 
management teams in firms and organizations. The resulting hierarchies became technical 
and professional – career concerns developed like climbing up corporate ladders and 
accumulating more authority and control. Along with all this, the progress in management 
science in universities and best practices emulated by firms in different industries 
transformed the management profession into a distinct occupational field. This also 
influenced the shaping of managerial conservatism in running firms: management teams  
started preferring policies that increased their tenure and advancement prospects in firms. 
Later on, as the market for corporate control developed, management became more tactical 
and aggressive. With the accumulated experience of the corporate world and progress in 
management science, it became clear that vision, mission, planning, culture, teamwork and 
coordination were extremely important in management. A farsighted policy could create a 
successful and gigantic enterprise with huge market power. Culture could make or break a 
firm. It became quite clear that the history of the firm was by and large the history of 
management and leadership.  
 
1 Chandler (1977)  pp7 
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But management, in order to function effectively, needs to record and access accounting 
data. Without such data, planning, evaluation, monitoring, coordinating and allocating 
(resources) become effectively impossible. The investors in the capital market need 
accounting data for monitoring firms and for investment purposes. Moreover, as will be 
argued in the next section, neither the accounts of entrepreneurial history of business, nor 
the socio-economic-political history of business and nor the structural and functional 
business history can give us exhaustively the essential insight into business history without 
weaving the thread of continuity and structure with accounting data. Therefore, in what 
follows, we shall be concerned about reconstructing corporate history primarily using 
accounting data. Theory tends to be essentially static or at best quasi-dynamic while the 
literature on business history described above tends to look for broad patterns and tends to 
aggregate information that takes away the details of a single story worth telling for its 
representative and instrumental value. The problem then is to construct an institutional 
narrative that captures the essential dynamics of corporate institution creation, institutional 
change, development into a large corporation and its maturity. We shall investigate the 
nature of alternative narratives of business in the next section and reflect on the necessity of 
using accounting data. Next, in Section 3, we would revisit the essential nature of 
accounting data. Section 4 and 5 discuss how institutional narratives can be constructed 
using accounting data. Section 6 concludes.  
 
II. ALTERNATIVE NARRATIVES AND THE ESSENTIAL ROLE OF 
ACCOUNTING DATA 
 
History of big business is usually written in three different ways. The first approach is to 
focus on the emergence of the entrepreneur who builds his empire by taking advantage of 
favourable business opportunities and by negotiating adversity through sound and 
innovative business practice. The second approach is to locate the emergence and 
continuity of big business within the context of broader social, cultural, economic and 
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political history. The third approach is to write the history of big business as the evolution 
of strategy, structure, and scale and scope.  
 
In American business history, some of the celebrated entrepreneurs are John D. 
Rockefeller, Andrew Carnegie, J. P. Morgan and Bill Gates. Each of them started from 
insignificant beginnings and rose to soaring heights. Rockefeller started as a bookkeeper 
in a commodities business house and by saving prudently, formed his own business 
which could eventually become an oil refinery company. He bought out competitors 
carefully and integrated forward into marketing and transportation of refined oil. He 
avoided laws against interstate integration by forming the Standard Oil Trust. However, 
his octopus organization came under attack from the public and the media for 
anticompetitive and monopoly practices and was eventually broken up into three dozen 
companies in 1911. Overall though, his business had a powerful influence on American 
corporate and economic growth. The story of Andrew Carnegie was also a rags to riches 
story. Starting as a poor Scottish immigrant, he helped build the powerful US steel 
industry through innovative business practices. While Rockefeller and Carnegie build up 
the backbone of US industry, they agreed that it was J.P. Morgan who financed the 
transformation. Morgan was the symbol of financial capitalism in America as he went on 
to finance and restructure railroads, finance the treasury, finance wars and merger and 
takeover deals. The story of Microsoft Corporation in recent times is also essentially an 
entrepreneurial history. It has transformed the world of personal computers by providing 
computer languages and operating systems. While America was experiencing the 
transformation into an economy dominated by big business towards the end of the 19th 
century and the beginning and middle of the 20th, other countries were having 
difficulties. There was no role for the big entrepreneur in socialist economies. In India the 
transformation took a long time due to lack of indigenous capital and technology and 
since the entrepreneurial spirit was stifled by the lack of an organized capital market and 
risk aversion of bankers in the pre-independence period and by the “licence raj” policy in 
the post independence period. The relative success or failure of business systems can thus 
 8
  
 
 
 
 
 
be explained in terms of the incentives and advantages to entrepreneurs who could build 
up large business structures. However, the place of the entrepreneur, while a necessary 
condition to be incorporated into business history, does not provide a sufficient account 
of structure, functionality and causality. While entrepreneurial history often capture the 
fundamental dynamics of transformation of small into big business, it also misses three 
important aspects of business – fitting the smaller entrepreneurial story into a broader 
canvass of social history of business, the evolution of strategy and structure, and the 
dynamics of team production under management supervision. 
 
In a masterly depiction, Ferguson (1998) recounts the history of the Rothschilds as a 
combination of social, cultural, political and economic history. The social history aspect 
focuses on the problems and aspiration of the Jews, particularly in the Frankfurt ghetto, 
that motivated some of the Jews like Mayor Amshel to rise above the social constraints 
using economic means. The cultural practice of enforced within family marriages kept 
the family ties strong and secure, a necessary condition for preserving the essential unity 
and coherence of the overflung and loose partnership that the firm was through the 
decentralized operations in London, Frankfurt, Vienna, Paris and Naples. The political 
practices of helping governments in need to leverage a high bargaining power and 
establish secure long-term relationships, of raising finance for war as well as peace, and 
of pre-empting important clients through ruthless business tactics, secured the growth and 
higher market share of the banking house. That the Rothschild's real eminence to 
financial power and glory was the product of the dislocations caused by the French 
Revolution and its aftermath also serves to illustrate that political history in the broad 
sense mattered a great deal. As an economic history, the rise of the Rothschilds can be 
traced to an elaborate network of communication and actions that arbitraged profit 
opportunities quickly until the rise of the telegraph, in diversifying well and offsetting 
idiosyncratic risks, and in specializing in underwriting and raising capital for 
governments. Later, in late 19th century and the 20th century, competition became more 
severe with some of the traditional advantages being neutralized, with the emergence of 
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new competitors in railway building in Europe, and with New York replacing London as 
the financial capital of the world, a place where the Rothschilds did not have a great 
comparative advantage in banking. However, the closed ties with military financial 
complex ensured that the Rothschild House would remain the most formidable 
investment banker in Europe. In recounting this story, Ferguson has created an integrated 
and multidisciplinary approach to financial history, and has elegantly constructed a 
narrative rich in texture and successfully bringing about the nature of human interaction 
in business under varied conditions of risks and rewards. However, several issues remain 
un-addressed or only resolved partially. One is the sources and uses of funds: it is 
believed by some historians and the public that funds that came in were embezzled funds 
while others believe that the inflow of funds were legitimate and rewards of skilled, 
honest and scrupulous banking. The uses of funds picture could have made it clearer 
whether on balance the Rothschilds were financing war or peace over the long run and 
how the short term investment banking strategy of the family was related to the long term 
goals and policies. While a qualitative picture of the growth of funds and assets is made 
available by Ferguson, it is not clear how risky and liquid were the assets and to what 
extent fixed assets were growing relative to current assets. On the cost side, the author 
presents little data from which one can ascertain the economies of scale and scope in 
investment banking. There is also little discussion on nature of the relationship between 
capital structure and governance of the partnership firm which could have illuminated 
how the governance of the firm evolved with the changing financial structure that altered 
relative payoffs and relative and contingent nature of control. Once again, a lack of 
attention towards the accounting data is the problem. Cliometricians would be interested 
in the question about whether the Rothschilds could at all have become a formidable 
investment banking house had the French revolution not taken place. But perhaps a more 
pertinent query would be that from a business historian about the actual and relative 
performance of the Rothschilds and the effect of financial structure of the firm on its 
growth. 
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Management scientists and business historians have focused on strategy and structure in 
their account of corporate history and evolution. Porter (1980) has identified five basic 
competitive forces created by different structural factors: bargaining power of buyers, 
bargaining power of suppliers, threat of potential entrants, threat of substitute products 
and competition from existing competitors. He has also identified three generic strategies: 
cost leadership, differentiation and focus. In his structural analysis of industries he has 
enumerated the dimensions of competitive strategy by discussing the different generic 
strategies in terms of their basic components and has defined the notion of strategic 
groups within an industry as the group of firms which follow the same strategy along the 
strategic dimensions. This enables the author to construct his comparative analysis and to 
argue why different performances of firms result within an industry. Porter analyses 
industry evolution in terms of these structural characteristics and strategies of firms. On 
the other hand, Chandler (1962) discusses how structure has followed strategy 
historically in the development of large industrial enterprise. The strategy of growth in 
volume of throughput and sales required an administrative office to handle one function 
in one local area. Geographical dispersion was another growth strategy which 
necessitated a departmental structure and headquarters to administer local field units. 
Vertical integration or functional growth called for a control and coordinating structure 
through the central office and the different departments. Finally, growth through 
developing new product lines necessitated a multidivisional structure. Thus the strategy 
of growth revolutionalized the method of business administration and marked the most 
important change in the history of large industrial enterprise. The most important sources 
of growth have been a tremendous increase in volume produced by large corporations by 
taking advantage of economies of scale and realizing the economies of scope to produce 
multiple products using the same set of inputs. Scale and scope economies in production 
and distribution made possible tremendous cost advantages and required enhancement of 
the capital-labour ratio and the maintenance of the optimal scale of production with 
respect to market demand and cost of production. This in turn required an efficient 
organizational structure and management oversight. Chandler (1990) depicts the growth 
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of modern industrial enterprise in a way which makes it clear how the administrative 
structure of a firm and the scale and scope of its operations were integral to the way its 
business history was written: "..the initial step in the creation of the modern industrial 
enterprise was the investment in production facilities large enough to achieve the cost 
advantages of scale and scope. The second step, which often occurred simultaneously, 
was the investment in product-specific marketing, distributing and purchasing networks. 
The third and final step was the recruiting and organizing of the managers needed to 
supervise functional activities pertaining to the production and distribution of a product, 
to coordinate and monitor the flow of goods through the processes, and to allocate 
resources for future production and distribution on the basis of current performance and 
anticipated demand.”  
 
The emphasis on the relationship between the structure of business administration and 
strategy, scale and scope has at the same time underscored the importance of accounting 
data. Chandler (1990) also describes how accounting becomes important in the evolution 
of modern industrial enterprise from the late 19th century: 
• managing an unprecedented large scale and scope of operations required a 
constant flow of information 
• coordinating the multidivisional hierarchies require improved managerial 
communication which required in turn new accounting procedures 
• the increased transfer of resources and commodities and services between 
different functional units 
• keeping track of economies of scale and scope of operations through cost sheets 
(usage of the concept of over and under-absorbed burden with respect to optimal 
scale and for comparing the benefits of using intermediaries versus in-house 
distribution or purchasing or procuring or research) 
 
In a similar vein, Johnson (1975) describes the nature of the centralized accounting 
system which emerged as a response to the increase in scale and scope, the multi-
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departmental organization, and the vertically integrated business enterprise of the late 
19th and early 20th  century. The Du Pont Powder Company was the leader in accounting 
innovations and Johnson describes how 
• financial costing data  were   shared by the different decentralized mills  of  the 
company so that  each mill superintendent could set targets to compete with the 
past performance of that mill and that  of other competitors 
• the centralized accounting system enabled the top management to control, 
coordinate  and assess the horizontal flow of operations among the company’s 
three main departments- sales, manufacturing  and purchases  (manufacturing and 
purchases were supplied with  detailed data on  buy versus make options and this 
in turn led to further vertical integration,  the sales department was supplied with 
the minimum  prices  and bonuses for sales growth  above targets were made 
possible due to the  use of historical price and demand data being continuously  
updated and analysed for  trend growth and measures  of deviation)       
• for strategic planning purposes, financial forecasts could be made to enable the 
management to know  to what  extent internal  and external financing  were  
necessary and forthcoming for financing the growth of fixed  assets  and how 
investments  were  to  allocated in the  face of  competing alternatives  
 
In particular, Johnson notes: “These remarks about the centralized accounting system 
employed by the Du Pont Powder Company indicate, I hope, that accounting historians 
can contribute significantly to the understanding of the development of big business. 
Accounting historians can very profitably examine the accounting procedures of firms 
which participated in the merger wave of 1897-1903 and were transformed from 
executing primarily only one activity, such as manufacturing, to integrating a number of 
operations. There are two major reasons for encouraging such an investigation. First, the 
inquiry would indicate how giant enterprises, vertically integrated, are able to function 
effectively. Many people in the early 1900s believed that large firms such as the Du Pont 
Powder Company would either topple from the weight of internal inefficiency or would 
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abuse their market power and pass the costs of bureaucratic inefficiency onto the 
consumer. The record of the past seventy years has disproved this gloomy prediction. 
Giant enterprise is quite capable of efficient and acceptable behaviour. Accounting 
historians can explain in detail one possible cause of this efficiency. A second reason for 
the accounting historian’s analysis is that, should he help to reveal why large firms 
operate effectively, he will ultimately provide valuable insight into the relationship 
between the growth of productivity in the American economy and innovations in the 
organization of big business.” 
 
Corporate history is replete with examples of importance of accounting data: the 
efficiency of corporate management and business administration has often depended on 
how systematically accounting data have been recorded and analysed by companies. 
General Motors suffered huge losses for the failure to charge to divisions for the cost of 
inventories they were accumulating in a weak market, while delegation with improved 
accounting information improved productivity in the same company later on. Problems of 
lack of cooperation at Salomon Brothers cropped up due to emphasis on individual rather 
than group evaluation and incentives. Not sharing accounting information by different 
divisions has hurt numerous corporates in their planning and operations. Capital markets 
have always reacted to accounting data by forming opinion on the future profitability and 
cash flows of large companies by using historical accounting data. Mergers and 
acquisitions in particular have always been driven new information revealed in the capital 
market through accounting data. However, accounting data, while necessary for keeping 
close track of corporate histories, is not sufficient. The recent failure of Enron has 
underscored the need to keep close track of accounting data of firms but has seriously 
questioned the integrity of auditing firms and the transparency and disclosure process. 
 
Accounting data recognizes that the activities of a corporate entity are characterized by 
finance, investment, operations and strategic planning. Therefore when using accounting 
data we have to ask questions accordingly. With respect to finance, the question to ask is the 
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following: how   did   the corporations choose their   capital structure initially and how did 
capital structure gradually evolve and stabilize? With respect to investment, one has to ask: 
how did the corporations make their capital budgeting decisions? How   did they allocate 
scarce funds over competing investment plans?  What was the consequence of   the 
investment decisions? With respect to operations the questions are: how was operational 
efficiency managed? On what variables did the corporations optimise to enhance operational 
efficiency?  How did strategic planning coordinate the use of resources to meet the demands 
made by the present and future  external environment  on  the  internal  organizational  
capabilities of the  corporates? This is the appropriate question on strategy. As we shall see, 
securing answers to these questions can go a long way in tracing corporate history.  
 
Accounting data provides a structural framework beneath which lies incentives, habits, 
culture, leadership, group behaviour etc. To understand change in its direction, causality 
and dimension requires alternative sources of information. Diaries reveal entrepreneurial 
vision, biographies tell stories of the spirit of accumulation, minutes of meetings of 
corporates reveal disputes and settlements over controversial decisions, memos from the 
central office to divisions indicate the economizing routines of business and pattern of 
change preferred by top management from time to time, social history documents why 
particular business and behaviour became “culturally” important, newspaper and journal 
reports indicate the financial health of a company. All these sources of information are 
important and necessary for reconstructing business history, but just as accounting data is 
not sufficient for that purpose without them, so do these alternative sources of 
information fail to provide the sufficient account of corporate history. Without 
accounting data, there can be no story of opportunity cost of investment, financial health 
of the company, and the efficiency with which the company has run its operations. 
Without access to books of accounts there can be no indication of cash flow generated by 
the company, nor its sufficiency in terms of liquidity, solvency and profitability. Clearly 
then, accounting data and alternative sources of information about corporate business 
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history need to be integrated. In this paper, the emphasis will be on accounting data with 
some indication about how different sources of information can be combined. 
 
 
III.  RECONSTRUCTING THE HISTORY OF A NON-FINANCIAL 
CORPORATE ENTITY 
 
A private limited  company or an entreprenurial  company may exhibit good prospects 
and the potential can only be realized through a large scale financing of the firm. As the 
prospect of  the company  varies,  so does  the price of  its share  on the  initial public 
offering. The initial public  offering made  through a investment  bank  is typically  
underpriced. Through this issue  the large corporate  organization  is borne as a public  
limited company. The   debt to equity  ratio at  this juncture indicates  the solvency  and 
rate  of  return  on capital of the  company. If the debt  to equity   ratio  is  too  high  then 
it  induces high risk  taking  behaviour  by the  management  of  the  company,   if  the  
ratio is  moderate,  then it  gives the company  the  required degree  of flexibility  to  
operate. On  the hand,  a   too  low  ratio  of  debt  to  equity tends   to give  rise   to too 
much of  discretion  over cash  flow  and  thereby to a waste of resources or to invite a 
takeover. When  the company does poor or  average in  terms  of  initial  investor   
expectation, it  may be  required to change the  management team.  With dispersed 
ownership and  imperfect  market  for corporate control it is difficult  to replace 
incumbent managment than with concentrated ownership. When the company  gets cash  
rich,  it  starts financing investment from internal resources which  are less  expensive 
than  external resources. For a company doing well, the shareholders worry  less about 
short term dividends  since  dividends in the future are high or capital gains are high in 
the short  term.  The story of finance is critical since only through securing finance on a 
large scale can a big business emerge and grow and the story of the capital structure is 
also important since choosing the “right” capital structure economizes on the cost of 
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capital and secure the right incentives for management of a firm. In this context three 
costs of debt financing has to be mentioned. First, when equity holders control 
management, high levels of debt encourage excessive risk taking since when high returns 
accrue, the equity holders enjoy all the extra returns while debtholders suffer part of the 
loss when bad outcomes occur. When a firm is having an operating loss  together with 
high level of debt, it has to forego profitable investment because new and therefore junior 
creditors who can finance the investments will fear that part of their investment will be 
diverted to meet the demands of the senior creditors. Historically, this problem, known as 
the debt overhang problem, has been quite important. A third, and well known cost of 
debt is bankruptcy. Despite these costs, debt has been a prominent feature in the balance 
sheet of corporations because of its disciplining role: it avoids the dissipation of extra 
cash flow by forcing companies to return them to the capital market and come for extra 
financing to the capital market more frequently than if companies were building up 
retained earnings. The modern corporation has used various financial innovations like 
issuing stock rights, stock splits, warrants, options etc. to achieve the optimal financial 
structure of the firm and economize on the cost of capital. However, securing finance, 
though extremely important, acquires its complete significance if it is combined with 
right decisions about capital budgeting and investment, operations and strategy. 
 
The  corporations which decided to  grow exponentially by increasing their  market  share 
in the  products they  offered increased their investment expenditure sharply. They  build 
sophisticated and large factories and bought or resorted to  homemade specialized  
equipments (thanks to vertical integration). Advanced assembly lines for making  
automobiles  and R&D  laboratories for making new drugs and chemical  products were  
the icons of these  new investments made.  Due to  increasing returns in many industries,  
the large scale investments and high levels of production ensured low  unit  costs and 
oligopolistic market structures. On the other   hand, those corporations which  failed  to  
increase   investment   had  low growth  in fixed assets and  could only have  a  marginal 
presence. The  story of large and  small  scale investments  could  be  deciphered   from  
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unit cost data supplied by  the  financial statements. There was another advantage with  
scale:  scale  and  scope economies went along well together and  allowed  mutiproduct 
large  corporations to flourish. Neither could  they  achieve  significant  scale economies. 
The corporations which made profitable investments in large scale projects over their 
course of history always had one thing in common: they set aside funds earmarked for 
depreciation, that is replacement of fixed assets, and they also set aside internal reserves 
to finance expansion.  
  
Profit and Loss statements  provide a good idea of operational  efficiency on a continuing 
basis. Trend growth  analysis of profits and detrending  the  growth  path  to   identify  the  
cyclical pattern  could yield rich  insights. Sources of revenue from different divisions or 
different product lines of a company give good indication about sources of growth and 
the relative profitability. However, the reports may not be true indications of  
profitability: one company reported in a  court proceeding  having underreported  
overhead costs to fend a takeover.  Trend and   event analysis reveals the persistence of 
revenues. Cost of sales   analysis could also be informative, for example it could tell 
which items of expenditure like advertisements, delivery etc. were  disproportionately 
high relative to  revenue  and to  other  product lines. Finally, break- even analysis 
reveals the minimum scale of operations. Liquidity management is another aspect of 
operations which is important  since having  sufficient liquidity  enables  the company   
to invest  quickly when investment  opportunities  arise.  Otherwise the company may 
have to forego profitable opportunity.  If liquidity is low then the company is in financial 
distress and may have to resort to fire sales of assets.  For extremely low level of liquidity 
a corporation may turn insolvent and declare bankruptcy. Liquidity is captured by the  
current   ratio  (the  ratio of current assets to  current  liabilities),  the  turnover rate of 
inventories, the  average  payback  period  of receivables etc. 
 
Strategy can be defined as inter-temporal and cross-sectional allocation of resources to  
maximize  the present  discounted value of  the  assets  of  the firm under uncertainty.  
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Besides the allocation of resources, it involves coordination, planning and appraisal. 
Strategy can be of the following types: (a) diversification (in terms of products  and / or 
geographic  expansion  and  / or client  type served) (b) focus on  specialized areas (c) 
vertical  integration (d) present versus future oriented  growth. If the discount rate is 
chosen to be fairly high then it implies  a  proportionately  higher growth rate of  fixed 
assets with  cash   flow  patterns  that  are  end-loaded rather than front-loaded.  On the 
other hand, if the discounting factor is much below unity, then current assets would 
dominate the assets portfolio and cash flow pattern would be front-loaded. Balance sheets 
would reflect these different strategies and enable the business historian to identify the 
comparative advantage of the firm. Price leadership through reduction of cost is a popular 
strategy to increase market share and mergers or takeovers frequently occur to achieve 
such cost reduction. To identify costs properly the volume must be defined   
appropriately  (like ton per kilometre in case of railway wagons) and costs  must   be  
assigned  properly.  Transfer pricing data can also be used for this purpose though it is 
susceptible to contamination by   different   sections of   management. The bottomline is 
growth of fixed assets at a reasonable cost and with a high return. It involves a single-
minded dedication of management team to growth and profitability, but more importantly 
it involves having a vision and mission as to how that growth is to be achieved in terms 
of market strategy and organizational strategy. The vision maybe to grow through 
financial innovations and mergers and takeovers, or selling some of the business units 
and focusing on core areas, or sacrificing short term profits for long term growth: 
accounting data and financial statements capture all of these. 
 
Note that  the short sketch above enables us to think of   corporate financing  history in  
terms of how  debt  and equity were  contracted over  time, how capital budgeting 
decisions were made, how operations were conducted and what strategy was chosen. It 
does  not undermine potential  stories about the entreprenial process, story of the 
management leadership in the growth of the firm, the story of labour and organized 
unions, how the management hierarchy in the firm operated, how effective was the 
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organizational structure, the investment  banker- entrepreneur  relationship, corporate 
governance through the board of directors or  the  social history of  capital  market 
formation. Rather, these separate sources of  information  should  be  integrated in the 
complete account of the  history  of financing  the corporate   entity.  Archival studies of 
minutes of meetings and memos in large organizations can reveal how capital budgeting 
and allocation of recources were actually made and how different constituencies pressed 
for and opposed alternative plans with serious long term consequences. Diaries and 
biographies reveal the vision and mission of the leadership in management as well in 
labour. One can trace back the real motivations, incentives and aspiration which resulted 
in actual decisions and negotiations with ramifications on the corporate growth process.  
       
IV. RECONSTRUCTING THE HISTORY OF A FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTION 
 
Here, I shall focus on the history of a bank. The main financial indicators of a bank are 
the growth of deposits and advances over time, growth of non-interest expenses, interest 
expenses and interest earnings over time, profitability (total profit/total capital) of the 
bank, liquidity to deposit ratio, advance-deposit ratio, fixed deposit to total deposit ratio, 
investment to advances ratio, bill discounting to advances ratio, dividend rates, ratio of 
establishment costs to deposits, earnings and expenses. All these we can get from the 
balance sheet of the bank. 
 
Typically, a bank starts as a capital rich entity which has participated in lucrative 
investment like domestic or international trade finance. It has own capital but has 
potential to grow  at a pace which own capital alone cannot finance. Therefore, the 
banking entity is created which starts canvassing for deposits in a large scale. Another  
way a bank  can start is as a regional small  entity with limited amount of own capital and 
proficiency in financing local trade, agrobusiness and some small manufacturing or 
mining industry. It is clear that the second  entity has a long way to go to become a large 
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banking corporation, but some do make it big from such humble beginnings and the 
capital structure management has a lot to do with it. Usually the capital structure of bank 
beginning its long or short journey into the financial landscape of an econonomy has 
some equity of the controlling owner cum manament, some equity raised in the local, 
regional or national capital market, some long term debt from the public and other term 
lending financial institutions and deposits. Deposits are cheap source of funds under 
financial regulation but they are a contingent liability – withdrawable on demand.  Thus 
in order to grow cheaply the bank grows through deposits but has to make provision for 
sudden as well as regular withdrawal. As a bank grows in terms of deposits  and 
advances, it becomes a vehicle for term transformation – conversion of liquid liabilities 
into illiquid assets. This becomes  a  major source of risk and the prudent bank raises 
more capital and sets aside more reserves to meet this increasing liquidity risk. The not so 
prudent ones are not bothered to go for costly additional equity and instead tilts 
dangerously towards more deposits. A local financial panic or an economy wide 
recession increases the liquidity premium and suddenly people are converting deposits 
into cash in an unprecedented way. Many banks fail including some of the go alone 
prudent ones aand typical the ones  who survive are  the ones who are prudent and with 
some amount of cooperation among themselves like interbank lending or mergers. In the 
afterermath of the crisis, the deposit to capital ratio has come down to ultrasafe levels 
such that the surviving banks begin to canvass for another round of deposits. In the 
meantime, the central bank has declared a lender of last resort policy, a policy of merging 
banks with weak financial structures and there is new regulatory agency which takes care 
of deposit insurance at a nominal premium. Confidence is revived, and our bank is 
encouraged to take a bit of a risk witthout feeling financial threatened. A new growth 
phase begins fuelled  by increasing confidence in the financial institutions like 
commercial banks. The demand for capital is low and that for deposits high and the price 
of capital falls to a level where they start going for equity financing. However, this is 
limited by the concern not to dilute the equity and return of the existing shareholders. But  
financial risk can never be underestimated whether emanating from panics based on 
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adverse signals about fundamentals or from beliefs which are only self fulfilling2. It is not 
only liquidity risk that can bring the downfall but also financial fraud and speculative 
investments madeby a bank. No matter what, everything is eventually reflected in the 
balance sheet, cash flow  statements and profits and  loss statements like a mirror. A 
panicking banking  regulator sets a high capital to asset ratio and  the scramble for equity 
begins. Thoe who can illafford are taken over by bigger banks. 
 
On the assets side, there is cash in hand and in other banks, which are considered safe for 
banks but yield a low return. On the other hand, advances generate higher yield but are 
riskier. There are, in the main, two types of advances: liquid and safe with moderate 
returns, and illiquid and risky with high returns. If the bank choses the latter, it grows 
faster provided the long assets pay off. investments in market securities like government 
bonds and loans and advances to non-financial business. Investments made in liquid 
marketable securities One measure of credit risk exposure is the ratio between bills 
receivable and the advances in the form of loans, cash credit and overdrafts. If the ratio of 
bill discounting to advances remains the same over time, then this implies that the growth 
of bills discounting and acceptance business is around the same as the rate of growth of 
advances, i.e. the bank has been keeping a balance between trade finance and industrial 
finance. The uncertainty of default can thus be countered by certainty of return in the bill 
business. The liquidity advantage from the bill business as opposed to illiquid industrial 
loans business can also be used as a buffer for liquidity shocks. Another important thing 
to be noticed here is that bank’s excessive risk taking behaviour increases with the 
increase of deposits. Bank with less inside capital and more deposit generally invests its 
money in risky channel. This is because the higher the risk, the higher will be the return 
to compensate the risk while having limited liability for low payoffs. Since the large 
proportion of money employed by the bank is not its own it put all the money in risky 
 
2 Individuals run on the bank because they  think others 
will, the resulting run has the bank making firesales of 
assets and becoming illiquid though being fundamentally 
solvent in the no run case 
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assets to get higher return. The higher interest expenditure incurred by bank to meet the 
interest on deposits also drives the bank to do so.  
 
Keeping a tolerably high advance to deposits ratio is a key requirement in commercial 
banking. If the deposit curve is increasing over time the bank is expending more on the 
interest expenditure and at the same time the bank is taking more risk too since the 
deposits can be withdrawn by the customers at any time leaving the bank in a crisis. 
When the deposit to loanable advances ratio is high due to high establishment costs in 
banking, the growth of advances become constrained. The growth of advances also 
become limited when the bank on account of its inherent conservatism or due to 
prudential regulatory liquidity norms, exhibit a tendency to ration credit within and 
across groups of borrowers. Again if the fixed deposit to total deposits ratio is rising the 
situation implies that the bank is taking comparatively lower risk as the fixed deposits 
can’t be withdrawn at any time. But at the same time it raises interest expenditure of the 
bank since bank has to pay comparatively higher interest rate on fixed deposit than on 
other deposits. Again if the advances are increasing over time the bank has been earning 
more interest income from those advances. The rising advances to deposits ratio shows 
that the bank is lending out more fund from whatever it has mobilized i.e. firm is 
behaving efficiently from an operational viewpoint. On the other hand bank with falling 
advances to deposit ratio is a less efficient bank. If the advances for working capital are 
larger than the advances for fixed capital the liquidity situation of the bank is in better 
position. At the same time it signals lower interest earning than with respect to finance of 
long term projects.Over time, movement of the bank’s total expenditure (which includes 
interest and non-interest expenditure) shows the expenditure side or the viability of the 
bank. If we get data on interest earnings and interest expenditures we can get a clear 
picture of the bank. Merely satisfying the high growth condition does not mean that the 
financial intermediary or the financial system it representing is efficiently discharging the 
process of allocation of resources under uncertainty. A necessary condition (though not 
sufficient) for this is profitability. It implies the creation of a surplus that can be used to 
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augment the financial and economic growth process further. However, profitability 
derived from a monopoly on monopolistic position that a bank has does not imply 
increase in efficiency. So a sufficient condition for profitability to be an efficient signal is 
the competitive market structure.The other signals of efficiency in banking industry are 
liquidity provision, term transformation, risk sharing and risk management. However, the 
provision of these services and functions are intimately connected with profitability. The 
ratio of total profit to total capital is a measure of profitability of the bank though cash 
flows are the actual liquid profit since much of the profits are booked. The important fact 
here is that the banking profit is not just interest earnings excess of interest expenses, 
fixed costs are to be taken seriously in the balance sheet appraisal. Liquidity to deposit 
ratio shows the liquidity risk of the bank. A lower ratio signifies higher liquidity risk.  
 
We can analyze the financial history of a hypothetical bank, say Bank X. It is seen from 
different balance sheets that both the deposits and advances are increasing over time and 
these are accompanied by the proportionate growth in capital. This signifies the good 
performance of the bank i.e. it is not taking undue risks. Most of the deposits are coming 
from personal loan. Though both the deposits and advances are growing the advances are 
growing more rapidly i.e. advance to deposit ratio is growing over time. This means the 
bank is in a secured position. However this did not increase the problem of liquidity of 
the bank since most of the advances were for short-term. But this resulted in low earning 
at the bank. The bank’s access to financial innovation was limited and the fixed costs 
were high for several reasons. There were also high interests on deposit. These imply that 
the bank was earning comparatively lower profit. However, this does not mean that the 
bank’s credit risk exposure is high since the ratio between bills receivable and advances 
in form of loans, cash credit and overdrafts is more or less stable. As a whole it can be 
said that the bank’s position was more or less reasonable. Lower profit was countered by 
other factors like liquidity, lesser credit risk exposure etc. In contrast, consider the 
posiition of a a bank Y which has grown faster: it has mainly grown by investing a 
greater proportion of its reesources in illiquid assets, that is in financing long term risky 
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but high return projects. For that purpose, it has had to set aside a higher proportion of 
reserves, but that has been countered by a high advances to deposits  ratio. Also, it has 
aggresively moved in the market for corporate control, merging with other banks or 
taking over other banks. With the growth of the economy and rising wealth of the 
consumers, it has made srategic forays into retail banking (apart from its established 
position in wholesale banking) and the problem of working capital management with 
respect to credit card receivables has been more than offset by the profitability of its 
operations. As it grows further it may sell its wholesale business altogether and focus 
exclusively on the retail business or it may engage in different types of asset management 
thus reaping the advantages of diiversification. It should be noted that both the banks are 
big corporates but while one has kept on growing at a fast pace, the other has virtually 
stopped to grow beyond its established deposit base. 
 
Strategy is the bridge between the organization and the external environment that 
maximizes the value of the bank assets. The fundamental function of a banking firm is to 
absorb, share and transfer risk while at the same time managing it’s risk exposure in the 
process of transforming liquid liabilities into illiquid assets and generating private media 
of circulation. The complexity of tasks when put together with oligopolistic markets and 
stakeholder satisfaction requirements, makes it imperative that a bank has a clearly 
defined strategy at any stage of its life. On the other hand, such a strategy has to take into 
account the resource constraints of the organization, specific capabilities and assets as 
well as the nature of the organizational networks and hierarchies. The determination of 
strategy requires cognitive and motivational effort from the top management. Sometimes 
the right strategy will not be selected since management has bounded vision and limited 
computational power while at other times management as a constituency will choose a 
strategy which is optimal for the management but not for the bank. These constitute the 
major transaction costs in strategy building. The fundamental tasks of a management 
team in an organization are the following: to have a clearly defined mission/vision, 
determine an optimal strategy with respect to that vision, and then implement that 
 25
  
 
 
 
 
 
strategy through the right organizational structure, correctly aligned incentives and 
corresponding business processes. A bank’s management may have a vision of the future 
where the bank transits from a local player to a global player, another bank may choose 
to define a path for itself in terms of growing competence and profitability in certain core 
area of operations while still another may focus on a future as a strong micro-credit 
institution. Theory tells us that the perceived growth of the market for bank assets and 
liabilities, the risk preference and the discount rate of the management may affect the 
vision that a bank ultimately has, but there is more to it than just these variables: 
psychology of the seed capital provider and that of the existing shareholders can affect 
the vision, so can the perceived areas of comparative advantage and core competence, 
and the modes of imagining the future have the final say of course. Theory has still less to 
say on what should be the right vision of an organization in a given circumstance. This is 
particularly troubling since a faulty vision and mission can have a disastrous effect on an 
organization. If the variance of a bank’s portfolio is relatively low while returns are 
significantly high, and the assets have high turnover in the market, then one can say that 
the bank has had a winning strategy. Of course, the story of how the winning strategy was 
selected was some prudent exercise in risk management at every step of operations, 
measuring risk, managing and transforming risk (through term transformation and risk 
transformation). Details of accounting data in banking like loans made, interest 
renegotiated, turnover frequency, default frequencies, debt to equity swaps, credit 
derivatives issued, loan commitments honoured, receivables managed, can all point out 
together towards a successful or a failed strategy. 
 
Memos and minutes of meetings are extremely important sources of information when 
one is studying the history of a bank. Such sources of information indicate how 
operations were conducted and different sources of funds were continuously allocated 
and reallocated from less profitable and less growing areas to areas with high growth and 
high profitability potential. Diaries and biographies of bankers and managers and labour 
leaders can shed light on how the bank was perceived from the point of view of different 
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constituencies and what the growth of the bank meant to each of them. Perspectives of 
financial planning and risk management help us understand the parametric space within 
which strategy was negotiated. 
 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Though analyzed and ready made financial statements are usually provided to the capital 
market, they are not sufficient for the purpose of the corporate business historian. The 
historian must also study the primitive books of accounts, namely the journals, the 
ledgers and form a view of how fixed capital growth came about incrementally through 
well planned policies and routines. In addition, he must always further analyze financial 
statements to gauge the solvency and liquidty of the firm along the path of its growth. 
Examining micro-accounting data and combining them with other sources of information 
can finally enable him to have an understanding of causality in business growth, of 
specific behavioral patterns in business that allowed better coordination by management, 
enabled strategic divisional teams to work more effectively, of how different cultural 
patterns become selfreinforcing and lead to growth and stagnation etc. Finally, using 
balance sheet and profit and loss data and cash flow data over long periods, the business 
historian can link market strategy to organizational structure such that the relation 
between strategy, scale and scope and structure becomes more transparent and revealing 
in understanding the dynamics of big business.  
 
It is important to finish with some final words on the reliability of accounting data. In 
accounting, there is always some room for maneuverability and innovations. To some 
extent, it is widely recognized that there will be some “creative accounting”. But 
excessive creative accounting can try to hide some real important data like actual losses, 
transfer pricing, management perks etc. Their occurrence can create large real and 
financial shakeouts which are completely unanticipated. The recent events throughout the 
world like the Enron and Satyam scandals are some examples. Due to the possibility of 
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such factors, the business historian needs to be even more vigilant when assessing 
accounting data and needs to find method of cross checking and verification with 
company transaction records at the microlevel so that the true financial picture emerges. 
An important step in this regard is not only to check the primitive books of accounts but 
also to be aware of the incentives to misrepresent true data. A company management can 
engage in misrepresentation of the data to reduce the burden of taxation or to raise cheap 
capital or to increase the stock price thus benefitting the top management. Auditors can, 
in principle, detect the various kinds of misrepresentations, but it must be admitted that 
the incentives to honest auditing have to be there. One important incentive in relational 
contracting is reputation, but in auditing it works the other way: the more accomodative 
an auditor the greater the chance of getting future audit contracts. The other incentive 
which works in the socially desirable direction, is being penalized by the government 
regulator for violating standard audit rules and ethics. But there remains the chance of the 
regulator being kept in dark with refined misrepresentations or of the regulator being 
captured through bribes. Being aware of these incentives and their potential strengths 
enables the business historian to discount misrepresentations in data and look for 
additional indicators which give the true picture. 
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